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Abstract
The literature on fiscal multipliers has evolved towards the notion that there is no such think as
a fiscal multiplier. These differ among many dimensions, including the aggregate state of the
economy, wealth and income inequality, the demographic structure to name a few. However, in all
of this studies, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Frisch) is held constant across countries.
Based on findings from Peterman (2015), we use micro data to estimate country specific Frisch
elasticities and find that these differences not only are quantitatively meaningful in explaining cross-
country differences in fiscal multipliers, but that the magnitude of the differences is much larger
than in most mechanisms that have been brought forward to explain cross-country heterogeneity in
fiscal multipliers.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade, the analysis of heterogeneous agents has been one of the most vibrant topics
in the macro literature. Alongside a renewed interest on the effects of fiscal policy, much focus
has been devoted to understand how fiscal multipliers vary across time and space. In particular,
it has been documented in the literature how different economic structural characteristics shape
the aggregate responses to fiscal stimulus and account for substantial cross-country variation in
fiscal multipliers. Such explorations included supply-side mechanisms that greatly rely on the
behaviour of the labor supply. Brinca et al. (2016), for instance, documents how the degree of
wealth inequality accounts for different aggregate responses to fiscal stimulus when it implies a
higher fraction of credit constrained households that turn aggregate labor supply less responsive
to future income shocks. Additionally, Brinca et al. (2019b) documents how the labor supply
responses to a precautionary savings motive may account for the positive relationship between the
recessive effects of a contractionary fiscal policy and income inequality1. Hence, in this context,
we propose to assess the quantitatitve relevance of accounting for country-specific magnitudes of
the intertemporal substitution of the labor supply in the aggregate response to fiscal consolidation.
In parallel, the intertemporal substitution of the labor supply – also referred to as Frisch
elasticity – has been at the center of a long-standing debate in the literature. The controversy
emerges from contradictory micro and macro-level evidence on the magnitude of this elasticity.
Historically, findings from micro-level data presented in MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) helped
to form the view that the Frisch elasticity is small, not surpassing 0.5. However, as discussed by
Reichling and Whalen (2012), that view was challenged by macroeconomic literature that found
required to use an elasticity ranging from 2 to 4, so as to replicate observed aggregate fluctuations
(King and Rebelo (1999) and Smets and Wouters (2003), for instance). The reconciliation of these
apparently divergent findings has motivated a new area of research.
1 Brinca et al. (2019a) has also analysed of the fiscal multiplier varies with the size of the shock
As suggested by Keane and Rogerson (2011), that branch of the literature has produced two
different approaches for understanding the source of the puzzle. On the one hand, there is a
set of studies that challenge the conventional mapping between the observations on labor supply
fluctuations and the preference parameters implicitly assumed to have generated them. As most
empirical applications hinge on those assumptions about the choice problem that generated the
data, studies like Domeij and Floden (2006)2 assessed how a different setting of the choice problem
driving individual decisions on labor supply can account for the gap in elasticities. In particular,
they show how ignoring liquidity constraints may bias downwards micro estimates when applying
identifications methodologies as in Altonji (1986). Precisely, given that the Frisch elasticity governs
the response in hours to an anticipated change in wage, it is closely related to the ability to
smooth consumption. When faced with an expected wage increase, agents will intend to smooth
it into consumption over time and this entails current dissaving that will be met by an increase in
hours worked when the wage rise matrializes. Hence, to the extent that agents cannot anticipate
consumption due to binding credit constraints, the incentive to intertemporally substitute labor
supply is reduced. This, in turn, implies that assuming complete financial markets in devising one’s
identification strategy will take a less responsive labor supply due to binding borrowing constraints
for a smaller Frisch parameter – and the one which would be captured in the absence of borrowing
constraints.
On the other hand, other studies focused on whether a de facto moderately small Frisch
parameter at the individual level may come to terms with a larger response at the aggregate level.
In fact, since the earlier microeconometric studies have almost exclusively estimated the Frisch
out of hours fluctuations on the intensive margin, findings as in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009),
suggesting that adjustments at the extensive margin may explain the gap between the micro and
macro evidence, motivated researchers to look into the micro data evidence on the intertemporal
substitution of the labor supply on the extensive margin. However, most of this work – surveyed
2 Similarly, Imai and Keane (2004) and Wallenius and Keane (2004) show that estimates will also be downward
biased by failing to account for human capital accumulation. While Low (2005) also explores the potential for
underestimation the Frisch parameter, in setting of uninsurable labor income risk where a precautionary savinggs
motive renders hours worked less responsive to anticipated wage fluctuations.
in Chetty et al. (2011) – takes the elasticity of participation rates for the Frisch elasticity on the
extensive margin, and, as argued by Peterman (2015), the two would only match if workers moving
into employment, work, on average, the same as those already previously working. Peterman
(2015) actually produces a micro data estimate of the Frisch driving hours fluctuations on both the
extensive and intensive margin of 2.64, more in line with what the macro literature suggests.
Thus, the extensive literature leads us to say that, as much as with fiscal multipliers, there is no
such think as a Frisch elasticity. Its value ultimately depends on the underlying choice problem and
on the larger economic environment. In fact, if the extensive margin accounts for a big portion of
the intertemporal substitution, then it may not only reflect preferences but also the technology
of job search and of hours adjustments, for instance. Thus, in different countries, the Firsch
elasticity underlying both extensive and intensive margin adjustments might be closer or further
from the macro literature benchmark. This is precisely what motivates our stance regarding the
magnitude of this parameter. Rather than adding to the on-going debate, we explore cross-country
variation of Frisch that emerges from different magnitudes of both the extensive and intensive
margin adjustments.
We therefore produce in section 2 country-specific estimates of the Frisch elasticity using the
approach presented in Peterman (2015). These are then used to calibrate a macro model previously
used to assess responses to fiscal consolidation programs (Brinca et al. (2019b)) and described
in section 3. In section 4 we detail the calibration procedure and in section 5 we analyze the
importance of country specific calibration of the Frisch elasticity to study the aggregate effect of
fiscal stimulus. Section 6 concludes.
2 Frisch Elasticity
The identification approach of the seminal work on the Frisch estimation (Altonji (1986) and
MaCurdy (1981)) was based on a simple life-cycle model of labor supply described in Equation
1. Recent studies that propose to solve the Frisch puzzle also used it as a benchmark, and it is the
starting point of our analysis. At any given point in time, an individual decision on consumption,
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λt = EtβΨt,t+1(1+ rt)λt+1
where λ is the marginal utility of wealth. By taking the logs of each and further manipulating, one
arrives at:
∆ln(nt) = η∆ln(wt)+η [ξt+1− lnβ − ln(1+ rt)−∆ln(χt+1)] (2)
where ξt+1 is the unexpected change in marginal utility. As the Frisch elasticity is defined as the
percentage change in hours due to a percentage change in wages, holding constant the marginal
utility of wealth 3, the main challenge to identify η is to extract the variation of wages that is not
associated with unanticipated changes - i.e., not correlated with surprises in the marginal utility, λ .
2.1 Estimation strategy
A natural approach for the estimation of η is to rely on the life-cycle profile of wages as the
source of anticipated wage variation. To additionally clean this predictable wage fluctuations from
correlation with a life-cycle trend in taste parameters of working, χ , one should also control for
changes in tastes. This led Altonji (1986) and Peterman (2015) to consider the following estimation
equation:
∆ln(nt) = η∆ln(wt)+δ +ζ ∆T St + εt (3)
3 It can be shown that, given the specified utility function - homothetic and separable, in consumption and labor;
η = dnt/ntdwt/wt |λ
where ∆T St is a vector of controls for taste parameters and δ a vector of year dummies to control
for interest rate changes. By definition, Equation 3 can only extract the Frisch parameter underlying
fluctuations of hours on the intensive margin, since it implies excluding non working individuals.
Peterman (2015) thus proposed to use a pseudo panel approach 4. It implies grouping individuals
into cohorts – defined by year of birth, e.g., – and taking the average of each variable within the
cohort, in every year. Equation 3 is then estimated with the panel of cohorts rather than the panel of
individuals. In this way, the Frisch is estimated using information on both intensive and extensive
margin adjustments. However, although this will make use of hours fluctuation of those moving
in and out of employment, it does not use the variation of wages of these individuals, as these are
unobserved. Since such is likely to exacerbate the point estimates we follow Peterman (2015) in his
application of this strategy with the predicted wages for the individuals not working. In practice,
this means predicting the wage of those not working and then proceed to produce the pseudo panel
using these predicted wages56.
2.2 Data
Performing labor market analysis across countries is often unfeasible due to lack of appropriate
data that typically consists of a panel with information on both hours and wages. For EU countries,
the Labor Force Survey (LFS) is the best reference for hours fluctuations - as it provides a long
panel at a quarterly frequency - but lacks information on labor income. On the other hand, the EU
Statistics on Living Conditions (EU-SILC) contains net labor income for several member states but
with seemingly limit information on hours worked. To be precise, EU-SILC provides, at a yearly
frequency, information on the weekly hours usually worked at the time of the interview and 12
variables on the employment status for each month. As described in Engel and Schaffner (2012),
these can be combine to form a monthly version of the dataset with hours worked per month: from
4 First suggested by Deaton (1985) to allow for panel data analysis when only cross-section data was available.
5 Like in Peterman (2015) the wages of non-working individuals were estimated using a Heckman-type correction for
selection bias. Specifically, we proceed as described in Wooldridge (2010)
6 Is worth noting that handling a pseudo panel as a genuine panel is not without caveats. We rely on the results of
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) that suggests the effects of taking a synthetic panel for a true panel will be attenuated
with a large enough cohorts, of at least 100 observations.
which annual hours are easily computed 7.
Similar to Peterman (2015) and Altonji (1986) we calculate the hourly wage by dividing net
labor income by annual hours worked and deflate them by the HICP. Further, observations with 250
per cent increase or a 60 percent decrease in wages were treated as missing, as well as observations
with swings of more than 13. We define cohorts by the year of birth and when calculating the
cohorts average we use the base weights adjustment proposed in Bors (2018).
2.3 Results
Table 1 reports our results for the Frisch estimation following Peterman (2015) approach8.
This entails the use of instrumental variables to estimate η in Equation 3, which includes age
polynomials, education dummies, interactions between the two and sex dummies 9. The set of
controls aims at controlling for changes in the disutility of work that are correlated with age. Year
fixed effects are used for all countries.
It is striking that the Frisch seems to vary widely across countries. Some point estimates are
closer to the micro evidence benchmark while others are more in line with the macro literature.
For our set of countries, the Frisch spans from 0.7 to 4.36 with and average of 2.02 and a standard
deviation of 1.2.
One possible limitation of this approach is the weakness of the IVs used. To cope with this,
Equation 3 was estimated with the continuously-updated GMM (the CUE of Hansen)10, which
is known to be more robust to weak identification bias. Further, it is reassuring to see that there
seems to be no correlation between a lower F-stat of excluded instruments and the magnitude of
the point estimates. This suggests that the variation in the estimated Frisch is not driven by weak
identification bias but rather true cross-country different in this deep parameter of labor supply.
7 As this annual hours series is central in our analysis we compare it against the LFS benchmark in appendix A: the
structural break for Sweden is indisputable, however, we obtain similar results when focusing on the last periods of
the sample.
8 The US results are taken from Peterman (2015) table 11.
9 The set of IVs is not identical to all countries, please refer to Appendix B.
10 This is the GMM generalization of the LIML (Limited Information Maximum Likelihood) estimator to the case of
possibly heteroskedastic and autocorrelated disturbances.
Table 1. Frisch Elasticity
Variables CZ EE EL ES FR LT LV PL PT SE US
(robust s.e.)
∆ ln(w) 2.02 1.21 3.68 2.39 4.36 1.53 1.08 2.23 0.70 1.01 2.64
(0.54) (0.67) (0.98) (0.98) (1.29) (0.66) (0.52) (0.36) (0.37) (0.54) (0.44)
∆ (Big city) -0.8 -0.32 -0.17 0.15 -0.06 -0.50 -0.55 -0.84 0.02 0.13 0.41
(0.21) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.36) (0.33) (0.19) (0.25) (0.22) (0.19) (0.29)
∆ (Medium-sized city) -0.01 -0.38 0.54 -0.24 0.60 -0.21 0.36 0.34
(0.23) (0.41) (0.40) (0.46) (0.49) (0.28) (0.23) (0.19)
∆ (Kids under 6) 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.23 -0.24 -0.20 0.01 -0.21
(0.18) (0.28) (0.21) (0.26) (0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08)
∆ (Kids) -0.20 -0.06 -0.32 -0.20 -0.05 -0.04 -0.21
(0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07)
Year dummies x x x x x x x x x x x
HH type dummies x x x
Observations 385 245 455 420 420 245 385 385 420 420 1,288
Ages 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 25-60 20-65
Years 05-16 09-16 03-16 04-16 04-16 09-16 05-16 05-16 04-16 04-16 68-97
1st Stage
F-stat (Excl. Inst.) 13.51 3.55 3.87 2.76 4.58 2.48 4.96 27.29 4.76 2.12 8.22
F-stat (P-value) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
J-Stat (P-value) 0.34 0.50 0.25 0.20 0.58 0.66 0.33 0.13 0.23 0.97 0.26
Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat 11.47 2.20 3.93 2.77 3.61 2.99 5.15 20.64 4.76 2.24
10% maximal size 5.44 4.45 5.44 4.84 5.44 4.45 4.45 4.84 4.84 3.21
15% maximal size 3.87 3.34 3.87 3.56 3.87 3.34 3.34 3.56 3.56 2.34
20% maximal size 3.3 2.87 3.3 3.05 3.3 2.87 2.87 3.05 3.05 2.06
25% maximal size 2.98 2.61 2.98 2.77 2.98 2.61 2.61 2.77 2.77 1.9
3 Model
This section describes the model used to study the role of the Frisch elasticity on the impact
of fiscal consolidation programs in different economies. It is a standard neoclassical model with
overlapping generations but with incomplete markets as in Brinca et al. (2019b), which proposed
the inclusion of a bequest motive for retirees to better capture dynamics of wealth accumulation
over the life cycle.
3.1 Technology
The representative firm uses capital , Kt , and labor efficiency units, Lt , in the productive process
according to Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt(Kt ,Lt) = Kαt L
1−α
t (4)
The capital stock law of motion is defined by:
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It (5)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital in each period and where It is gross investment in period
t. The decision on input units is driven, in each period, by profit maximization:
max
Lt ,Kt
Πt = Yt− [wtLt +(rt +δ )Kt ] (6)





















At any given period, each households’ endowment of efficiency units of labor is determined
by its permanent ability a - where a∼ N(0,σa) -, its age, j, and a household-specific idiosyncratic
productivity shock, ut , characterized by an AR(1) process:
ut+1 = ρut + εt+1,ε ∼ N(0,σ2ε ) (9)
It follows that an individual’s wage is given by:
w( j,a,u) = weγ1 j+γ2 j
2+γ3 j3+a+u (10)
where γ1, γ2 and γ3 accounts for the age profile of labor efficiency units, and where w is the wage
per each of those units, determined in a competitive labor market.
3.3 Demographics
There are J overlapping generations in our economy. Each new household has age 20 and every
household retires at 65. A model period corresponds to one year, meaning that active work-live
spans over 40 model periods. Let j denote households’ age. Those retired face a probability of
dying π( j), dependent on age; and no household lives longer than 10011. We assume population
size is fixed. By normalizing each new cohort’s size to one, according to the law of large numbers,
the mass of retired households is given by Ω j = ∏
q=J−1
q=65 ω(q), where ω( j) = 1−π( j) denotes the
survival probability.
Households are heterogeneous across asset holdings, idiosyncratic productivity, permanent
ability, their subjective time discount factor and, of course, age. The discount factor is time
invariant and is one of three values , β ∈ {β1,β2,β3}, uniformly distributed across each generation.
11 Implying that J=81
Permanent ability is realized at birth. During their work-life, agents decide how many hours to
work, n, and how much to consume, c, in each period. When retired, they make no decision on
labor supply and receive the social security payment, Ψt .
Given there are no annuity markets, the bequests left by deceased households are equally
redistributed among all other households through a lump-sum transfer denoted by Γ.
3.4 Government
The government’s behaviour in the model is characterized as follows. The social security
system is always balanced, with the proceeds from taxing employees and employers - at rates
τss and τ̃ss - exactly offsetting the benefits, Φt , paid to retirees. Taxes on consumption, labor and
capital income are used to finance government expenditures on pure public goods, Gt 12, lump-sum
transfers, gt , and interest on public debt, rtBt . It is assumed that there is some outstanding public
debt and that this evolves so as to keep the debt-to-output ratio, Bt = Bt/Yt , constant over time13.
While consumption and capital income are taxed at flat rates, labor income is taxed in a non-linear
fashion. We use the functional form proposed in Benabou (2002) and argued to fit the US data
appropriately in Heathcore, Storesletten and Violante (2017):
τ(y) = 1−θ0y−θ1 (11)
where τ(y) stands for the average tax rate applied to pre-tax labor income of y. Parameters θ0
and θ1 capture the level and progressivity of the tax schedule, respectively14. Finally, if one takes
Rt for total tax revenue and Rsst for total the total revenue form social-security contributions, the







= R−G− rB (12)
12 These enter separably in the utility function
13 Such implies the ratio of government revenues-to-output and government expenditures-to-output are constant in the
steady state.









A household’s decision is driven by a monetary utility function, U(c,n), dependent on










with σ representing risk aversion, χ the disutility of working and η the Frisch elasticity. In this
model wealth accumulation over the life cycle is also influenced by a bequest motive, since retirees
obtain utility from the wealth stock they leave to the other generations when they die:
D(k) = φ log(k) (15)
3.6 Recursive formulation of household problem
Any household is characterized, at each point in time, by the vector (k,β ,a,u, j). Where k
denotes household’s savings, β the time discount factor, a permanent ability, u the idiosyncratic
productivity shock, and j the household’s age. Thus, for households of working-age, the decision
problem on hours worked, n, consumption c, and future net assets holdings,k′, can be formulated
as:





V (k′,β ,a,u, j+1)
]]
s.t. :










n ∈]0,1], k′ ≥−b, c > 0 (16)
Y L denotes labor income net of social contribution taxes and labor income taxes. τss and τ̃ss denote
the rates of the social-security contributions paid by employee and employer, respectively. As for a
retired household facing a probability π( j) of dying and who obtains utility form any bequest left,
the decision problem is defined by:
V (k,β , j) = max
c,k′
[
U (c,n)+β (1−π( j))V (k′,β , j+1)+π( j)D(k)
]
s.t. :
c(1+ τc)+ k′ = (k+Γ)(1+ r(1− τk))+g+ψ
k′ ≥ 0, c > 0 (17)
3.7 Stationary recursive formulation of competitive equilibrium
With Φ(k,β ,a,u, j) defining the measure of households with the corresponding characteristics,
the stationary recursive equilibrium is defined by:
1. Given the factor prices and the initial conditions, the value function V (k,β ,a,u, j) and
the policy functions, c(k,β ,a,u, j), k′(k,β ,a,u, j), and n(k,β ,a,u, j), solve the household
optimization problem.








































3.8 Fiscal experiment and transition
The fiscal experiment considered is identical to that of Brinca et al. (2019b), and consists of an
unanticipated fiscal consolidation program that reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio in 10 percentage
points over 50 years. Concretely, we focus on the case of a gradual decrease of government
purchases, G, of 0.2% of the steady-state GDP per year. At the end of the consolidation program,
public spending returns to its initial level, and public transfers adjust in order to balance the public
budget. It is assumed that the economy takes another 50 years to converge to the new steady state
with the reduced debt-to-GDP ratio.
The appendix D defines the transition equilibrium subsequent to the fiscal experiment. The
main modification is that the dynamic programming problem of households requires a new state
variable: time, t, that controls for all the changes in policy and price variables relevant for the
their optimization. Like in Brinca et al. (2016) and Krusell and Smith (1999), the numerical
solution of the model needs guessing on paths for all variables dependent on time and solving
this maximization problem backwards, subsequently updating the guess.
3.9 Definition of the fiscal multiplier
In the context of either fiscal consolidation policy, we distinguish between the impact multiplier
and the cumulative multiplier. For the debt reduction through cuts in government spending, G, the
impact multiplier is given by:




with ∆Y0 being the output change from period 0 to period 1 and ∆G0 the analogous for government
spending. The cumulative multiplier is then given by:
























with ∆Yt being the output change from period 0 to period t and ∆Gt the analogous for government
spending.
4 Calibration
The model described in the preceding section was calibrated for 6 different countries: France,
Spain, Portugal, Greece and the United States. Whilst some of the model parameters have
straightforward empirical counterparts - and can therefore be calibrated exogenously -, others
represent theoretical concepts not directly observed in the data. Hence, the latter are calibrated
by means of a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach, whereby these endogenously
calibrated parameters are set such that the model replicates some targeted data moments of each
economy.
4.1 Wages
For the parameters governing the live-cycle profile of wages we resort to the procedure adopted
in Brinca et al. (2016) and Brinca et al. (2019b). The authors estimate, for each country, the
empirical counterpart of equation 10, using data from the Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS):
ln(wi) = ln(w)+ γ1 j+ γ2 j2 + γ3 j3 + εi (20)
with j as the age of individual i. Regarding the persistence of the idiosyncratic shock, ρ , their
estimate results from PSID data for the US and which we apply to all countries. Likewise, for
the European countries, we take the average of the calibrated values of σa, the variance of time-
invariant ability, used in Brinca et al. (2016) and the corresponding value for the US. The variance
of the idiosyncratic shock, σε , is then fixed to replicate the variance of the log of wages in each
country.
4.2 Preferences and borrowing limit
The set of parameters calibrated endogenously also includes the disutility from work, χ , the
bequest motive, ϕ , the discount factors, β1, β2 and β3, and the borrowing limit, b. These are chosen
in order to replicate, respectively, the observed fraction of hours worked per year, the ratio between
the average of wealth held by households from 75 to 80 years old and overall average wealth 15,
the capital ratio K/Y , and the three wealth quartiles. As for the Frisch elasticity, we take the point
estimates from table 1.
4.3 Taxes and social security
The rates of the social-security contribution of employee and employer are assumed to be flat.
We take the respective average between 2001 and 2007 from OECD. The consumption and capital
income tax rate, are also assumed flat and are calculated following Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). As
for the labor income tax schedule described in equation 11, we follow Brinca et al. (2019b) by first,
estimating θ0 and θ1 for several types of households using OECD data on labor income tax, and
then, taking the weighted average of θ0 and θ1 16, so as to apply to all households in the model 17.
15 As in Brinca et al. (2019b) we take the figure for the US economy as the benchmark for all countries.
16 The weights used are the share of each family in the total population in the U.S. data
17 Appendix E summarizes these figures for all countries calibrated
4.4 Parameters calibrated endogenously
The SMM approach is used to calibrate the parameters with no direct empirical counterpart: ϕ ,
β1, β2, β3, b, χ and σe. It consists of minimizing the loss function:
L(ϕ,β1,β2,β3,b,χ,σε) = ||Mm−Md|| (21)
where Mm and Md are the data moments for the model and the data, respectively. As described
previously, we have the same number of parameters to be endogenously calibrated and targeted
moments. This ensures the system is exactly identified. Table 2 summarizes the the calibration fit
for the U.S., please refer to table 5 for a more detailed summary for all countries. In the case of the
U.S., we achieve an average error margin of 0.678%.
Table 2. U.S. calibration fit
Data Moment Description Source Data Value Model Value
ã75/ā Mean wealth age 75-80 / mean wealth LWS 1.513 1.511
K/Y Capital-output ratio PWT 3.073 3.078
Var(lnw) Variance of log wages LIS 0.509 0.509
ñ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.248 0.248
Q25, Q50 Q75 Wealth Quartiles LWS -0.014,0.004, 0.120 -0.013,0.000,0.124
L(ϕ,β1,β2,β3,b,χ,σε) 0.678
5 Results
5.1 Inspecting the mechanisms
In the fiscal experiment we consider the government conducts a debt consolidation program that
aims to reduce debt-to-output ratio by 10 percentage points over 50 periods. This is achieved by a
reduction in public spending of 0.2% of the steady-state output, in each of those 50 periods, that is
unanticipated. Our main purpose is then to understand how the effects of this policy are shaped by
the country-specific structural behaviour of the labor supply.
In our neoclassical macro model, the responsiveness of labor supply is crucial to define
the transition path to the new steady-sate of a lower public debt ratio, starting from the one
previously calibrated. The decrease in public expenditure, G, triggers a crowding-in effect on
private investment that spurs the accumulation of productive capital in the following years. Then,
as the capital per worker ratio increases the productivity of each labor efficiency unit, real wages,
will also rise in the future. In turn, with households perceiving the increase in their life time income,
there is an immediate increase in private consumption and also a reallocation of labor supply over
time. An intertemporal substitution effect that lures households to exchange a more expensive
future leisure for more leisure today drives them to reduce hours supplied in the immediate short-
run, and thus leading to a decrease in output.
It is precisely the Frisch that governs the magnitude of such substitution effect. A higher
Frisch means a larger responsiveness to an expected rise in future wages and entails a greater
intertemporal substitution effect. However, as pointed out by Keane and Rogerson (2011), the
link between the Frisch and the intertemporal substitution will be muted by incomplete markets.
Since credit constrained agents will be unable to borrow against their higher future income, they
face less incentives to concentrate their life-time labor supply in the periods of higher wages, and
consequently attenuate aggregate response today.18.
Figure 1: Cumulative multipliers over the first 5 periods
Output cumulative multiplier (left panel), Labor Supply cumulative multiplier (middle panel) and Consumption
cumulative multiplier (right panel) in the first 5 periods in Spain (dashed line) and Portugal (solid line) .
Figure 1 illustrates this mechanisms by comparing the response to the fiscal consolidation of
Spain and Portugal. These are specially suited for comparison given the identical fraction of credit
constrained households in the two economies. The gap in both countries’ response in terms of labor
18 Bernardino (2019) finds this effect to be specially relevant when accounting for differences in the distribution of
liquid wealth.
supply is thus imputable to a Frisch elasticity in Spain of 2.39 with respect to 0.7 for Portugal.
5.2 Cross-country analysis
In order to quantitatively validate the role of Frisch elasticity on the fiscal multiplier we expand
our analysis to the entire set of calibrated countries. The model allows for a reasonable set of
country characteristics to shape its aggregate response. These include the wealth distribution, and
the closely related fraction of liquidity constrained households, the degree of labor income risk that
entails a precautionary savings motive and different time-discounting preferences. Although all of
these come into play at varying degrees, Figure 2 emphasizes the relevance of accounting for cross-
country differences in the Frisch. It depicts a strong quantitative and positive relationship between
the elasticity and the multiplier of the fiscal experiment that is statistically significant. Further, it
also corroborates the described interplay between the Frisch and the share of credit constrained
agents in the economy. With a comparable Frisch elasticity the gap in the response of Spain and
the USA, and of Greece and France is imputable to a fraction of liquidity constrained agents that
attenuates the sensitivity of the labor supply adjustment 19.
Figure 2: The Frisch and the impact multiplier
The impact multiplier and the estimated Frisch elasticity (table 1). The correlation coefficient is 0.858 with a p-value
of 0.063
Finally, we assess the added explanatory power of a calibration with country specific Frisch as
19 The USA calibration produces 13.47% of credit constrained households with respect to 5.72% for Spain. For France
this Figure is 6.71% in comparison to 5.08% for Greece
oppose to the standard calibration procedure of setting this elasticity equal to one. The red dots in
Figure 3 depict our calibration of a country-varying Frisch while the black dots depict the standard
calibration. With the former procedure, our model is able to produce a much wider variation of
impact multipliers, ranging from 0.35 to 0.9. Yet again, the Figure shows that such calibration
enables the model to replicate a statistically significant interplay between credit constraints and the
deep parameter governing much of the intertemporal substitution of labor supply. The country-
specific Frisch calibration mutes, quantitatively and statistically, the relationship between liquidity
constraints and fiscal multipliers.
Figure 3: Credit constrained agents and the impact multiplier
The impact multiplier and the fraction of credit constrained agents replicated by the model. In red the model calibration
allowing for a country-specific Frisch (correlation coefficient is -0.317 with a p-value of 0.603), in black the model
calibration where the Frisch is set to 1 for all countries (correlation coefficient is -0.9016 with a p-value of 0.037).
6 Conclusion
This work contributes to the literature explaining variation on fiscal multipliers through a
supply-side perspective. By modelling an overlapping generations economy from a neoclassical
standpoint, with uninsurable labor income risk and liquidity constraints, we produce evidence
suggesting that the variation of the Frisch elasticity parameter across countries may explain a large
dispersion of fiscal multipliers. Although the link between the Frisch parameter and the actual
aggregate intertemporal substitution response of the labor supply is deteriorated by the fraction
of liquidity constrained agents or the existence of uninsurable labor income risk, our supply-side
driven economy setting produces a quantitatively relevant positive relationship between the Frisch
parameter and the size of the fiscal multiplier.
Micro data evidence suggesting substantially country heterogeneity on the Frisch parameter un-
derlying hours fluctuations on both the extensive and intensive margin, emphasizes the importance
of this mechanism for further analysis on fiscal policy. Based on our results an interesting future
research avenue would be to deepen the analysis of the interplay between the rivaling labor supply
driven mechanisms in shaping the response to fiscal stimulus. Our set of 5 modeled countries had
limited variation on the fraction credit constrained agents and recent work by Bernardino (2019)
showed that accounting for the liquid wealth distribution may reveal a stronger effect of liquidity
constraints on the labor supply.
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Appendix
A Match of yearly hours with LFS
















































































Table 3. Excluded instrumental variables
IVs CZ EE EL ES FR LT LV PL PT SE
Age polynomial x x x x x x x x x x
Primary education x x x x x x x
Tertiary education x x x x x x x
Sex x x x x x
Occupation dummies x
Occupation dummies x Age x
Tertiary education
Primary educ. x Age x x x
Tertiary educ. x Age x x x
Sex x Age x x x
C Tax Function
20 Given the tax function
ya = θ0y1−θ1
which we employ, the average tax rate is defined as
ya = [1− τ(y)]y
and thus
θ0y1−θ1 = [1− τ(y)]y
and thus
1− τ(y) = θ0y−θ1
20 This appendix is borrowed from Hotler, Krueger and Stepanchuk (2017)
τ(y) = 1−θ0y−θ1
T (y) = τ(y).y = y−θ0y1−θ1
T ′(y) = 1− (1−θ1)θ0y−θ1









and therefore independently of the scaling parameter θ0. Thus by construction one can raise
average taxes by lowering θ0 and not change the progressivity of the tax code, since (as long
as tax progressivity is defined by the tax wedges) the progressivity of the tax code21 is uniquely
determined by the paramenter θ1
D Definition of a Transition Equilibrium after the Unantici-
pated Fiscal Consolidation Shock
22We define a recursive competitive equilibrium along the transition between steady states as
follows:
Given the initial capital stock, the initial distribution of households and initial taxes, respectively
K0, φ0 and {τl,τc,τk,τSS, τ̃SS}t=∞t=1 , a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of individual functions
for the household, {Vt ,ct ,k′t ,nt}t=∞t=1 , of production plans for the firm, {Kt ,Lt}t=∞t=1 , factor prices,
{rt ,wt}, government transfer {gt ,Ψt ,Gt}t=∞t=1 , government debt, {Bt}t=∞t=1 , inheritance from the dead,
{Γt}t=∞t=1 , and of measures, {Φt}t=∞t=1 , such that for all t:
21 Note that




and thus as long as θ1 ∈]0,1[ we have that
T ′(y)> τ(y)
and thus marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates for all incomes.
22 This appendix is borrowed from Brinca et al. (2019b)
1. Given the factor prices and the initial conditions the consumers’ optimization problem
is solved by the value function V (k,β ,a,u, j) and the policy functions c(k,β ,a,u, j),







nt(kt ,β ,a,u, j)dΦt∫
ct dΦt +Kt+1 +Gt = (1−δ )Kt +KαL1−α












4. The Government budget balances:
gt
∫
dΦt +Gt + rtBt =
∫ (























7. Aggregate law of motion:
φt+1 = γt(φt)
E Calibration: additional figures
Table 4. Country-specific calibration targets and exogenous parameters
Macro ratios Labor targets Age profile parameters Taxes
K/Y B/Y ñ Var(lnw) γ1 γ2 γ3 θ0 θ1 τ̃ss τss τc τk
France 3.392 0.559 0.184 0.478 0.384 -0.008 6.0e-05 0.915 0.142 0.434 0.135 0.183 0.355
Greece 3.262 1.038 0.230 0.220 0.120 -0.002 1.3e-05 1.062 0.201 0.280 0.160 0.154 0.160
Portugal 3.229 0.557 0.249 0.298 0.172 -0.004 2.6e-05 0.937 0.136 0.238 0.110 0.208 0.234
Spain 3.378 0.368 0.204 0.250 0.114 -0.002 1.4e-05 0.904 0.148 0.305 0.064 0.144 0.296
USA 3.074 0.428 0.248 0.509 0.265 -0.005 3.6e-05 0.888 0.137 0.078 0.077 0.364 0.047
Macro ratios: K/Y is dreived from the Penn World Table 8.0, average from 1990-2011; B/Y is the average of net
public debt from 2001-2008, IMF data.
Labor targets: ñ comes from OECD data, year average from 1990-2011 ;Var(lnw) and γ1,γ2γ3 are estimated according
to equation (20), using the most recent LIS survey available before 2008. Data for Portugal comes from Quadros de
Pessoal 2009 database.
Taxes: θ0,θ1 are estimated as described in section 4.3; τ̃SS,τSS are the average social security taxes paid by the
employer and by the employee, respectively, using OECD data of 2001-2007; τc and τk come from Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011) or calculated using their approach and correspond to the average effective tax rate from 1995-2007.
Table 5. Endogenous parameters and calibration fit
Country β1 β2 β3 b χ ϕ σε L
France 0.933 1.006 0.979 0.06 4.3 4.38 0.506 0.800
Greece 0.979 0.994 0.9775 0.00 5.5 4.3 0.121 1.630
Portugal 0.964 0.992 0.952 0.00 20.5 5.1 0.38 1.841
Spain 0.933 0.993 0.974 -0.05 9.2 5.6 0.237 2.704
USA 0.988 0.924 0.915 0.175 5.0 6.24 0.307 0.678
The last column displays the value of the loss function defined in equation 21. It can be interpreted as the average
error margin (%).
